## **EXHIBIT 1**

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                  IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
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                            SHERMAN DIVISION
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     THE STATE OF TEXAS, et al,
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                    Plaintiffs,
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                                              Case No.:
          VS.
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                                              4:20-cv-00957-SDJ
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     GOOGLE, LLC,
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                    Defendant.
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                           MOTIONS TO DISMISS
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                       TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
                   BEFORE THE HONORABLE SEAN D. JORDAN
                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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                  Thursday, April 18, 2024; 1:37 p.m.
                              Plano, Texas
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      (Continued on page 2.)
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quasi-sovereign or sovereign standing.

MR. KELLER: Absolutely, Your Honor. There has to be injury in fact. We've --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KELLER: -- talked about parens patriae and injury to a quasi-sovereign interest. I think the Article III head of jurisdiction that they're inviting us to entertain speaks to sovereign interest. I will concede for the Court there's a lot less precedent that's on point there. We don't have something squarely on point for sovereign standing. I don't think they have anything on point for sovereign standing. So the safer course is parens patriae.

THE COURT: And let me ask you, on parens patriae, because I'm going to get to sovereign standing with you, you had mentioned that, you know, you haven't really seen a case that supports their theory. You said really you just would be looking at the dissent in the Georgia case. But what about -- this is a case cited by the other side from 2017, Ninth Circuit -- the Missouri v. Harris case? That's a case where the Ninth Circuit rejects parens patriae standing, and, you know, it's from 2017.

And I would like to get your thoughts on that case because that's a case where -- I'm sure you're well familiar with the facts, but basically you had California had passed legislation about what kinds of eggs could be sold in

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problematic for the States.

But for constitutional injury purposes, we've done more than we need to, certainly, on the pleading. THE COURT: All right. You can continue. MR. KELLER: I think that I've exhausted my prepared remarks, Your Honor. I'm happy to talk about sovereign standing some more, if you would like. I've admitted that there is a dearth of case law on that, so parens patriae I think is the easier ground. But --THE COURT: Let's talk about sovereign standing because this comes back to the point that was made by Mr. Mahr, meaning he focused a little more on parens patriae, but the Harrison case, you know, lays out very clearly the test for sovereign standing. And it seems problematic for the States under that test because the only part of the test that it seems like the States could meet could be something about being able to enforce their own laws. And I don't know that I see that here. In other words, I look at the test in Harrison, which is very clear, and I match that up with what's at issue in this case, and it looks like it's

And so my question to you is in light of the standards that are clearly sovereign in *Harrison*, how do you get -- how do the States fit into that here to get the sovereign standing?

MR. KELLER: I'll give you my best shot at it, Your

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Honor. So Massachusetts v. EPA from the Supreme Court, leaning heavily on Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion from Lujan, says that "Congress has allowed to depart from the common law default for injury in fact. It can create injuries that wouldn't have been previously recognized." And I think the default is certainly that when there's a violation of federal law, it's for the federal sovereign, an Article II executive branch officer, to go enforce that violation. But the antitrust laws are unique in that Congress expressly desired for the states to play a crucial role in the enforcement of the antitrust laws and to address violations of the antitrust laws. And this case is a good illustration as to why. The States here are the ones who led the investigation. They filed the complaint. They largely survived a motion to dismiss. And then the United States jumped in and said, yeah, this is a really good piece of work that you've done. We're going to copy you and go to Virginia. And I am casting no aspersions. We're thrilled that the United States has come along for the ride and has recognized the harm that Google is causing to markets, but the States did the leg work for that at Congress's invitation. And so where you have Congress under Massachusetts

v. EPA inviting the states to enforce federal law, and you

have precedent going all the way back to Testa v. Katt saying that a violation of federal law is a violation of state law because federal law under the supremacy clause is the law of the state, I think in that unique confluence of situations, plus Congress saying exclusive federal jurisdiction, we can't file our federal antitrust claims in state court, they can only be filed in an Article III tribunal, I think all of that suggests that the States do have a sovereign injury.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Keller.

MR. KELLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Mahr?

MR. MAHR: Just a few comments, Your Honor.

Certainly, if they want to bring a diversity case before the Supreme Court, they can do that.

And I'm focused on this case and the idea that if there is no on-point precedent, it's because this is such a unique situation. And they've got something else that was remarked upon by the Harrison court, I think it was, that that says something about the whether they said an interest or not. And this is a unique case in that it's a federal claim being used to get into federal court to bring these 17 state DTPA claims on, seeking only redundant injunctive relief -- nothing else under the federal antitrust laws -- when there are private cases in the Southern District of New York, many of them seeking the exact same relief on behalf of